Quantcast
Channel: 24/7 Live Malware Mix
Viewing all articles
Browse latest Browse all 4651

Hello, Antony!, (Sat, Jan 14th)

$
0
0





Antony Elmar owns quite a few domain names. He lives in a lovely city called Kansas, US, but seems to make his home there on a park bench, because he doesn't have a street address. On the upside, the park bench does have a phone extension, but one with a phone number that is a tad odd for Kansas, US and has a dial prefix that looks more like Italy:

Domain Name:EVORMCORP .IN




Created On:14-Jan-2012 00:01:08 UTC




Last Updated On:14-Jan-2012 00:01:10 UTC




Expiration Date:14-Jan-2013 00:01:08 UTC




Registrar:Directi Web Services Pvt. Ltd. (R118-AFIN)




Registrant Name:Antony Elmar




Registrant Organization:N/A




Registrant Street1:none




Registrant City:Kansas




Registrant State/Province:




Registrant Postal Code:67420




Registrant Country:US




Registrant Phone:+3.976639877

None of this fazes the domain name registrar Directi Web Services in Mumbai, India, to the least. And Antony has been busy - he bought a dozen or so new domains over the past two days, and managed to bring them live within a matter of minutes after purchase.

His new domains currently point to 89.187.53.237, in Moldova. Yup, ol'Antony is quite the international business executive, conducting his trade on three continents with equal ease! The IP used seems to change about once per week, until past Thursday, Antony's virtual HQ was at the neighboring IP, 89.187.53.238.

His latest new domains include

cyberendbaj .in




cyberevorm .in




endbaj .in




endbajcomp .in




evorm .in




evormhost .in




evormcorp .in

and provide a generous helping of malware to users unlucky enough to get redirected there via what appears to be poisoned ads on legitimate web pages. Antony's toys currently seem to use URLs with a certain pattern that you can search for in your web logs with a command likeegrep -E '\/.{8}\/\?[[:xdigit:]]{60}'

Example result from earlier today:




http://endbajcomp. in/rgy9hcgw/?1a4c39a0370ad0f641cc790b5d0acdb24eba0f2d2483b98b4076689a4684

Caveat - that regexp might of course also match on perfectly benign web site URLs.

The malware uses CVE-2010-0842 (javax.sound.midi) and CVE-2011-3544 (Rhino script engine) and when successful seems to download an executable off a URL that matches[0-9]'






If you find anything of interest in your logs, please let us knowvia the contact form, or comment below.





(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. http://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
Source: http://isc.sans.edu/diary.html?storyid=12400&rss

Viewing all articles
Browse latest Browse all 4651

Trending Articles